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Rights, Rights, and Rights:
A Ward's Right to a Hearing,
A Guardian's Right to a
Standard, and an Heir's
Right to an Inheritance
A recent guardianship decision from a
Florida appellate court bears close
scrutiny regarding due process rights
and the right to "Medicaid Planning."
By Edward A. Shipe
"I yrtle Mackey is eighty-six years
old. She was once a vibrant
person. But with the passage of
time and age, she has developedM a need for continuous assistance.
Mrs. Mackey lives in a nursing home in Martin
County, Florida.
Her relatives became concerned. Court proceed-
ings ensued, she was adjudicated incapacitated, and
plenary guardians were appointed to exercise all of
her delegable rights.
The guardians initially find that Mrs. Mackey
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has approximately $78,725 in assets, and a monthly
income of $980.97.1 The guardians eventually peti-
tion for the authority to "gift out" to Mrs. Mackey's
family. By that time, the guardians have spent
$32,152.56, and keeping her in the nursing home
would deplete almost all of her assets and qualify
her for Medicaid benefits in less than eleven months.2
Presumably, her family had hoped and expected to
receive some inheritance from her. In most situations,
she would have wanted her family to receive an in-
heritance.
In non-guardianship circumstances, an attorney
might well advise a client, perhaps using a power of
attorney or some other instrument, to "gift out" sums
of money on a set schedule, to help the person qualify
for government assistance, such as Medicaid, after a
given point in time. But not all persons possess the
wisdom of advance planning with experienced coun-
sel. And guardianship, vexing in many situations,
again proves to be a prism through which not all
light passes.
The guardianship judge refuses to receive evi-
dence and hold a full hearing.3 Instead, the court
receives proffers in the form of affidavits from two
witnesses. One witness asserts that the ward and the
family had undertaken such advance planning as joint
accounts, and that they had a close relationship. The
other witness, an attorney with expertise in elder-
law matters, asserts that the gifting would not
penalize Mrs. Mackey in receiving Medicaid ben-
efits, and that such gifting is legal.'
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The judge denies the petition, finding that "Med-
icaid planning" is not in the ward's best interests.
An appeal is taken. The appellate court reverses the
trial court, holding that a hearing should have been
held, and that the court should have attempted to
determine what the ward would have wanted, i.e.,
the "substituted judgment" standard.
This scenario resulted in one of the most inter-
esting guardianship opinions to come from a Florida
appellate court in recent memory. This article dis-
cusses the case of Rainey v. Guardianship of Mackey,
reprinted here as Exhibit A.6
The Rainey opinion discusses three very inter-
esting points, to be explored in this article in turn:7
1. The due process rights of a ward' and a
guardian to an evidentiary hearing on mat-
ters in which a guardian seeks authority to
take an action.
2. Whether a guardian's decisions are to be
governed by "substituted judgment," deter-
mining what the ward would have wanted
to do, or by the ward's "best interests," a
subjective determination on the part of the
guardian.
3. Whether a guardian has the authority, or can
be granted the authority, to deliberately de-
plete a ward's assets to such an amount as to
qualify the ward for Medicaid assistance
payments.
The Right To A Hearing In Guardianships:
Don't Slam The Courtroom Door
Florida's guardianship code is a complicated laby-
rinth of statutes? The Florida Legislature desires the
appointment of guardians in only the most obvious
and needful circumstances. 10 A lengthy constitutional
discussion focusing on due process rights is prob-
ably not necessary, and in any event beyond the scope
of this publication. It should suffice to simply note
that under both the United States and the Florida
Constitutions, a person's right to life, liberty, and
property cannot be deprived by the government with-
out "due process" of law.
A 210-year-old body of developing case law and
code has explored the contours of what "due pro-
cess" means, what "liberty" means, and what "life"
and "property" mean. Over such a long period, the
definitions have been somewhat elastic, befitting a
nation that has grown from a small agrarian colony
to an urban superpower. In any event, the delega-
tion of a person's rights by court order to a guardian
would seem to obviously implicate a person's right
to due process. And the failure to hold a hearing
before entering an adverse order would seem to ob-
viously violate due process.
A number of recent Florida cases have reversed
trial courts that failed to hold hearings before enter-
ing orders. In one case,11 a trial court that summarily
cut a guardian's hourly rate from $25 to $5 was di-
rected to hold a hearing and take evidence on a
reasonable hourly rate. In a separate decision,13
another trial court had written in a reduced
guardian's fee without a hearing. The trial court was
reversed and ordered to either grant the guardian's
requested fee or set a hearing.
And in Rainey, the court takes pains to note the
absence of a record from which a full statement of
facts could be drawn.
These cases comport with relatively elementary
appellate practice-a court wants a full record on ap-
peal before rendering a precedent-setting decision.1 4 But
one perceives a hidden second hand at work: sensitiv-
ity to due process. Florida's code painstakingly preserves
a person's right to due process in a guardianship. The
rights to access the courts, to counsel, and to court
review of a guardianship can never be removed from a
person and delegated to a guardian."5
In some cases, with limited assets, a court may
be tempted to skimp on a hearing to save on legal
fees. Nevertheless, in important decisions affecting
a ward's welfare, it is incumbent on trial courts to
give a ward and a guardian the opportunity to form
a full record, so that an appellate court has a fair
chance to undertake a complete review.
One is reminded of the famous dictum of Su-
preme Court Justice Robert Jackson: "We are not
final because we are infallible, but we are infallible
because we are final." The higher one goes in the
court hierarchy-from trial court to court of appeal
to Supreme Court-the higher the level of infallibil-
ity, if not always finality. Of course, the hierarchy is
evidence of how much our society values due pro-
cess: if one court acts unjustly, there should be
recourse by appealing to a higher court.
A skeptical guardianship court should err on
the side of holding a hearing on a questionable
request. In this fashion, even if the judge's skepti-
cism manifests into an adverse ruling, at least the
persons involved will have a better feeling that their
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arguments were fully heard-and a better opportu-
nity to correct any errors on appeal.
"Substituted Judgment" versus
"Best Interests": Is That Your Final Answer?
A guardian faces two possibilities in the decision-
making process: to base a decision on what the ward
would have wanted, or to base a decision on what
the guardian thinks is best for the ward. The former
is called the "substituted judgment" standard; the
latter is called the "best interests" standard.
Many Florida cases apply the "substituted judg-
ment" standard, i.e., the guardian tries to determine
what the ward would have wanted to do.16 For ex-
ample, decisions involving the disposition of property
involve basing a decision on what the ward would
have wanted.17 The Rainey decision follows the no-
tions that a ward's desires should be paramount in
determining how and whether to dispose of prop-
erty, and that a guardian's subjective involvement in
decision-making should be minimal.1 "
However, other Florida decisions apply the "best
interests" standard, primarily in the area of personal
rights such as medical decisions, residential decisions,
and social decisions.1 9 "Under this standard, the
charge of the guardian is to make an independent
decision on behalf of the ward." 20 Generally, the
guardian takes a parental role and does what "is
best" for the ward, though the action taken may not
be what the ward wants.
One's best reconciliation of the cases is that "sub-
stituted judgment" applies in situations involving
property, or in situations where the ward's intent can
be clearly divined, such as with living wills or ad-
vance directives. "Best interests" would apply to
personal decisions or in situations where there is no
clear evidence of a ward's intentions.
A ward's intentions are sometimes clear. For ex-
ample, an account is found titled in two names, the
ward and a family member. That usually expresses
an intention to have the second person receive the
funds when the ward dies.
In other situations, intentions are murky. People
do not always make wills or otherwise plan for their
older years. People do not always make logical deci-
sions about their property or their person. In these
situations, a guardian is hard-pressed to simply watch
as the "intentions of the ward" result in the dissipa-
tion of assets, or the placement of a ward in a
detrimental social situation.
Florida's courts are likely to be called on again
for assistance in determining what standard governs
a guardian's decisions. Some guardianship cases in-
volve long-standing family "feuds" or "tugs-of-war,"
which eventually become fountains for adjudication
by guardianship courts. Such a case is likely to end
up as another court precedent from an appellate
court, and in that fashion the "tug-of-war" between
these two concepts of decision-making may eventu-
ally result in coherent law.
Whether A Guardian Can Engage In Medicaid
Planning: Is That Your Final Question?
The ultimate question involved in Rainey, the issue
that generated the greatest interest among local prac-
titioners, involved the authority of a guardian to
"spend down" a ward's assets in order to qualify for
Medicaid.21 It is a question ultimately left undecided,
though the opinion appeared to have at least a tiny
skepticism that anyone could engage in such plan-
ning, let alone a court-appointed guardian.
A guardian often faces two awful choices: either
watch the nursing home "spend down" a ward's as-
sets, or become proactive and "spend down" the ward's
assets through gifting and donating. In Florida, the
choices are especially common, given the high cost of
nursing home care and the large number of low- and
middle-income persons who spend their retirement
here.22 In any event, the ultimate destination is the same:
the receipt of government assistance through the Med-
icaid program.
Medicaid was enacted as part of the "Great So-
ciety" initiatives of the 1960s. "It reflected the
contemporary focus on poverty." 23 The intention
behind the program was to provide a safety net for
indigent persons, in the same vein as AFDC and food
stamps. "Medicaid enabled many eligible poor
people to go to doctors for the first time in their
lives. ' ' 24 In later years, Medicaid became a mecha-
nism for the reimbursement of nursing homes. Once
a person's assets had been spent down to nothing by
the costs of the nursing home, that person could re-
ceive Medicaid benefits, regardless of how wealthy
the person had been.
There is a certain counterintuitive quality to
"Medicaid planning" by a person or by a guardian.
In essence, a person is rendering himself or herself
"poor," regardless of their wealth or class, in order
to receive payments from the government. "After the
program was enacted, there was concern over the
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widespread divestiture of assets by mostly wealthy
individuals so that those persons could become eli-
gible for Medicaid benefits. As a result, Congress
enacted laws that imposed periods of ineligibility for
such benefits where the applicant divested himself
or herself of assets for less than fair market value." 25
It is this counterintuitive aspect to "spending
down" which may receive the disapproval of some
guardianship judges. Some may well focus on what
the ward would have wanted with respect to post-
mortem provision for family and for heirs. But others
may focus on whether a ward would have wanted
to be "poor" and dependent on government assis-
tance. The answers are likely to vary from case to
case, and are often not likely to be obvious. The de-
cisions are likely to vary from judge to judge.
Whether there is a better system that would pro-
vide for older persons while protecting an estate is
debated and debatable. 26 We have learned to expand
the "quantity" of life, but as guardians and elder-
law attorneys well know, we have not learned how
to continue the "quality" of life. Though many of us
are likely to live well into our eighties and nineties,
our memory of time before those years is likely to be
dim, and our ability to maintain our lives during
those years will probably be minimal.
As our population continues to age, the debate
over how to provide for our older population is likely
to grow louder, and hopefully become more focused.
As we post-Yuppies have often observed, the
Boomers certainly will change many things, some-
times for better and sometimes for worse. Though,
as the economist John Maynard Keynes once noted
in the 1930s, "in the end we are all dead."
The "final question" may not be whether a
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